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EXCUSES, EXCUSES: THE APPLICATION  
OF STATUTES OF REPOSE TO 
ENVIRONMENTALLY-RELATED INJURIES 
Andrew A. Ferrer*
Abstract: Injuries resulting from environmental conditions created by 
improvements to real property have always been commonplace. Across 
jurisdictions, however, there is some evidence to suggest that defendants 
may be able to escape liability for certain environmentally-related inju-
ries by invoking statutes of repose. Although statutes of repose may pro-
tect defendants from prejudice in court and relieve them of past obliga-
tions, they may also prevent injured plaintiffs from obtaining redress in 
court where their injuries were latent or undiscoverable. This Note ex-
plores the nature and purpose of statutes of repose, discusses whether 
they might be used by defendants during environmental litigation by 
addressing case law and public policy considerations, and offers sugges-
tions for balancing the interests of plaintiffs and defendants to the ex-
tent that statutes of repose are applicable to environmental injuries. 
Introduction 
 Landowners frequently hire contractors, architects, or related 
professionals to perform services on their property to make im-
provements, such as adding new construction or renovations. Often, 
the work is performed properly and to the satisfaction of the land-
owner. However, negligent or improper performance of such work 
may result in environmental damage and personal injuries to the 
landowner or other individuals. These plaintiffs would likely expect 
compensation from those who are responsible for their injuries, but 
that may not always be possible. State legislatures have enacted laws 
that regulate the time during which defendants may be held liable for 
the injuries of others. Such laws are known as statutes of repose. Like 
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose bar a cause of action from 
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being ªled in court after a speciªc period of time has elapsed.1 Stat-
utes of repose grant defendants a substantive right to be free from 
liability for the purpose of protecting them from obligations long 
past,2 guarding against prejudice in court by ensuring good evidence 
is present,3 and enabling them to plan their future activities with 
greater certainty and conªdence.4
 Although many courts have held statutes of repose to be constitu-
tional,5 a plaintiff’s claim may be barred before the cause of action 
has accrued or before the injury has been discovered because statutes 
of repose begin to run earlier than statutes of limitations.6 As a result, 
many plaintiffs might ªnd themselves with no redress in court; espe-
cially plaintiffs whose injuries were latent for long periods of time.7
 Many of these statutes of repose pertain to liability arising from 
making improvements to real property.8 Accordingly, an important 
question is whether a statute of repose could be used by defendants 
facing liability for environmental harms or injuries that have occurred 
in connection with such services. This question is particularly impor-
tant in light of the latency of environmental harms and the legal and 
sociopolitical concerns of fairness to plaintiffs and defendants alike. 
Should defendants, who have caused plaintiffs to suffer injuries and 
environmental harms, be immune to liability by virtue of the passage 
of time? Should the recovery interests of injured plaintiffs be bal-
anced against—or even superseded by—defendants’ interests in leav-
ing the past behind? What environmental considerations would play 
into the effect of statutes of repose in such litigation? This Note will 
address some of the legal and social policy issues that statutes of re-
pose may present in an environmental context by evaluating the stat-
                                                                                                                      
1 See Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516–18 (Mass. 1982); Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (Va. 1987). 
2 See Mark W. Peacock, Comment, An Equitable Approach to Products Liability Statutes of 
Repose, 14 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 223, 229–32 (1994). 
3 See 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste § 17.05[4], at 17-248 (Susan M. Cooke ed., 
2004) (discussing rationales and principles underlying limitations periods). 
4 Peacock, supra note 2, at 231–33. 
5 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4][d], at 17-259. 
6 See Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198 (Super. Ct. 
1996). 
7 Developments in the Law—Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1462, 1609–10 (1986) 
[hereinafter Toxic Waste Litigation]; see Lisa K. Mehs, Comment, Asbestos Litigation and Stat-
utes of Repose: The Application of the Discovery Rule in the Eighth Circuit Allows Plaintiffs to 
Breathe Easier, 24 Creighton L. Rev. 965, 965–66 (1991). 
8 See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (2004); see also Josephine H. Hicks, Note, The 
Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose: Federalism Reigns, 38 Vand. L. Rev. 627, 629–31 (1985) 
(explaining different types of statutes of repose). 
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utes purpose, effect, and construction. In addition, this Note outlines 
arguments that plaintiffs and defendants may make regarding the ap-
plication of statutes of repose in environmental litigation. 
 Part I of this Note examines the nature of statutes of repose and 
describes their acceptance as constitutional. Part II offers insight into 
how statutes of repose have been justiªed and discusses their relevance 
to environmental claims. Finally, Part III takes an analytical look at stat-
utes of repose in an environmental context, evaluates the degree to 
which they may or may not be used in environmental litigation in light 
of case law and public policy considerations, and offers suggestions as 
to how to balance interests when applying statutes of repose. 
I. The Nature of Statutes of Repose and Constitutionality 
A. The Difference Between Statutes of Repose and Statutes of Limitations 
 Generally, a cause of action must be ªled in court before it is 
barred by an applicable statute of limitations or statute of repose.9 
However, to plaintiffs and defendants, a statute of repose seems like a 
statute of limitations; both are legal instruments that limit a cause of 
action by imposing a time constraint.10 Part of the confusion is exacer-
bated by the fact that courts have often been “inconsistent with their 
use of these terms.”11 Nevertheless, because each statute relates to dif-
ferent aspects of the cause of action, the statutes differ in their 
signiªcance in litigation.12
 A statute of limitations restricts the amount of time in which 
plaintiffs may ªle actions in court to enforce rights after their injuries 
have been, or should have been, discovered.13 If the plaintiff does not 
ªle within the limitations period, his right to a remedy is waived.14 
Accordingly, a limitations statute can be seen as primarily an adminis-
trative tool used to facilitate court ªlings, since it is a rule that relates 
to procedure rather than substance.15
                                                                                                                      
9 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1604. 
10 See Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (Va. 1987). 
11 Peacock, supra note 2, at 225–26. 
12 See id. at 225–27. 
13 Id. at 225–27; see Sch. Bd., 360 S.E.2d at 327–28. 
14 Peacock, supra note 2, at 226. 
15 See Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1982); Sch. Bd., 360 
S.E.2d at 327–28; Robert I. Stevenson, Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limita-
tions—A Call for the Legislative Rescue Squad, 16 U. Rich. L. Rev. 323, 334 n.38 (1982) (“[A] 
‘statute of repose’ is intended as a substantive deªnition of rights as distinguished from a 
procedural limitation on the remedy used to enforce rights.”). 
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 Because environmental lawsuits are often centered around “allega-
tions of improper activities that can be years, even decades, old, the 
statute of limitations is an important and frequently relied upon de-
fense in such cases.”16 However, a time-barring statute that begins to 
run before potential plaintiffs show signs of injuries may preclude op-
portunities to obtain compensation.17 Today, a majority of jurisdictions 
have adopted a “discovery exception” that requires the limitations pe-
riod not to begin until the plaintiff knows of—or has reason to know 
of—the injury.18 Discovery rules limit the effectiveness of statutes of 
limitations as a defense in environmental litigation.19 However, even if 
discovery rules are generally accepted across states, they will not wholly 
eliminate the possibility that some claims would be time-barred.20 Some 
states have limited discovery rules to statutes of repose.21
 Statutes of repose limit the time during which a defendant may 
bear potential liability for injuries against plaintiffs.22 Unlike a statute 
of limitations, “[a] statute of repose begins to run from the occur-
rence of the incident raising liability,” rather than from the moment a 
cause of action accrues or an injury is discovered.23 Statutes of repose 
typically apply to negligence and strict liability claims as well.24 Where 
a statute contains language that restricts a party from ªling an action 
after a speciªc date or time period, or provides that “no action may be 
ªled for a claim that accrued before a particular date,” this is usually a 
“tell-tale sign that the statute is one of repose, not of limitation.”25
 What does a statute of repose mean for litigants? Simply stated, 
claimants must ªle their suits within the applicable statute of limita-
tions period, “but in no event may suit be brought after expiration of 
                                                                                                                      
16 Dean F. Paciªc, Recent Court of Appeals Decision Highlights: The Importance of Timely As-
sertion of Claims in Environmental Litigation, Warner Norcross & Judd LLP Business Up-
date, Feb. 2000, http://www.wnj.com/bup0200.html. 
17 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-247 to 17-249. 
18 Id. 
19 Paciªc, supra note 16. 
20 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1606. 
21 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-248; Carey C. Jor-
dan, Comment, Medical Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 
33 Hous. L. Rev. 473, 480 n.45 (1996). 
22 Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Mass. 1982); Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
360 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (Va. 1987). 
23 Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198 (Super. Ct. 
1996). 
24 James L. Connaughton, Comment, Recovery for Risk Comes of Age: Asbestos in Schools 
and the Duty to Abate a Latent Environmental Hazard, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 512, 517 (1989). 
25 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) rev’d on other 
grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000). 
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the repose period.”26 Therefore, if a plaintiff’s cause of action does 
not arise or is not discovered before the statute of repose has run, it 
will be “extinguished” even if the plaintiff satisªes the statute of limi-
tations; the defendant will thus escape liability.27 Unlike statutes of 
limitations, statutes of repose create “a substantive right in those pro-
tected to be free from liability after a legislatively-determined period 
of time.”28 Statutes of repose gain their substantive quality by acting as 
an absolute bar to a cause of action.29
 However, since statutes of repose may relieve defendants of liabil-
ity even before a cause of action has accrued or been discovered,30 
their application to environmental claims is controversial.31 In a vari-
ety of environmental cases—most notably, toxic exposure and con-
tamination cases—a plaintiff may be unaware of an injury until long 
after it has occurred.32 Many environmental cases “tend to involve in-
juries or damages that evolve over time.”33 For example, “[h]azardous 
substances may be released and migrate continuously for decades” 
before the toxins, or symptoms of illness, are detected by individuals 
or communities.34 Property damage from environmental contamina-
tion may similarly be latent; thus, many years will often pass before the 
discovery of harm to property and the commencement of an action.35 
Therefore, it is these kinds of situations in which the running of a 
statute of repose before an injured party has discovered his cause of 
action has the potential to leave him without any relief.36 In essence, a 
statute of repose exempliªes the doctrine of “‘damnum absque injuria’ 
(‘a wrong for which the law affords no redress’).”37
                                                                                                                      
26 Peacock, supra note 2, at 227. 
27 See id. at 227; see also Sch. Bd., 360 S.E.2d at 327–28 (holding that a statute of repose 
makes the defendant immune from liability when the repose period has run). 
28 First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
29 Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 293 S.E.2d 415, 418 (N.C. 1982). 
30 Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198 (Super. Ct. 
1996); Sch. Bd., 360 S.E.2d at 327–28. 
31 See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1604–10. 
32 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-249. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 17-248 to 17-249. 
37 Cyktor v. Aspen Manor Condo. Ass’n, 820 A.2d 129, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2003) (quoting Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (N.J. 1972)). 
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B. The Constitutionality of Statutes of Repose 
 Despite the possibility that plaintiffs may be left without recom-
pense for injuries, federal courts have held statutes of repose to be con-
sistent with the U.S. Constitution;38 statutes of repose have survived 
scrutiny with respect to due process and equal protection challenges, 
since courts have held that the statutes do not involve fundamental 
rights or suspect classiªcations.39 Challenges to statutes of repose are 
more effective when based on state constitutions.40 However, state 
courts usually follow the standards of review set forth by the Supreme 
Court of the United States when evaluating statutes of repose,41 apply-
ing the lenient rational basis review in the absence of any fundamental 
right or suspect classiªcation.42 Under a rational basis test, courts will 
uphold a statute as long as it is merely rationally related to a permissible 
legislative objective.43 Courts have not had much difªculty in conclud-
ing that statutes of repose serve their intended legislative purposes.44 
Courts have consistently held that the prevention of stale claims and 
the protection of defendants from protracted liability are “well-
established” objectives for legislatures to pursue with statutes of re-
pose.45 Accordingly, legislatures may reasonably conclude that claims 
should no longer be viable after a certain number of years following 
substantial completion of improvements to real property.46
 Viewed differently, the success of equal protection challenges 
under state constitutions may largely depend upon “how closely a 
state’s equal protection analysis mirrors that of the United States Su-
preme Court’s consideration of equal protection violations of the 
United States Constitution.”47 The rational basis analysis is likely fa-
vorable to those protected by a statute of repose, since it is an ap-
proach to constitutional law that is “designed to provide substantial 
deference to the legislative body . . . which generally yields a conclu-
                                                                                                                      
38 See Britt v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 637 F. Supp. 734, 737 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
39 See id. at 736–37 (holding that statute of repose did not involve a fundamental right 
or suspect classiªcation, and was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose). 
40 Jan Allen Baughman, Comment, The Statute of Repose: Ohio Legislators Propose to Lock 
the Courthouse Doors to Product-Injured Persons, 25 Cap. U. L. Rev. 671, 681 (1996). 
41 Hicks, supra note 8, at 636–37. 
42 Id. at 636. 
43 Id. at 643. 
44 Id. at 636–37. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 638. 
47 Baughman, supra note 40, at 682–83. 
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sion validating the legislation under consideration.”48 In contrast, ju-
risdictions that employ a stricter standard or require a “tight match” 
between a law and its intended legislative purpose are less likely to 
ªnd a repose statute constitutional.49 A similar trend has been noted 
with respect to due process analysis among the states.50
 Jurisdictions which have held statutes of repose to be unconstitu-
tional have generally predicated this result upon “open court” provi-
sions—requiring courts to remain open for any injury—of their re-
spective state constitutions.51 Recently, at least thirty-nine states have 
retained “some form of open courts provision.”52 In many of these 
states, “the courts view such open court provisions as a requirement 
that the state provide some remedy for every legally recognized 
wrong,”53 although the speciªc language and construction of a state’s 
open courts provision will control the scope of its applicability.54 In 
some states, the mere possibility that a statute of repose could bar a 
cause of action before it arises is often sufªcient to violate an open 
courts provision.55
 Some courts have held that an “absolute denial of access to courts 
before the claim even arises is antithetical to the purpose of open 
courts provisions.”56 In such states, the underlying theory is that 
“‘[d]eath cannot occur without there ªrst being conception . . . . Nei-
ther can a cause of action expire before it accrues.’”57 One state that 
follows this line of argument and is particularly averse to statutes of re-
                                                                                                                      
48 Stephen J. Werber, A National Product Liability Statute of Repose—Let’s Not, 64 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 763, 768 (1997). 
49 Baughman, supra note 40, at 682–83. 
50 See Hicks, supra note 8, at 644–45. 
51 Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 965–66 (Ariz. 1984); Hicks, supra note 8, at 644–
45. 
52 Werber, supra note 48, at 774 n.57. 
53 Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 966 (citations omitted). 
54 Hicks, supra note 8, at 644–45. For a good example of a state open courts provision, 
see Ala. Const. art. I, § 13 (“all courts shall be open; and that every person, for any injury 
done him, in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have a remedy by due process of 
law; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay”). 
55 Baughman, supra note 40, at 681. 
56 Hicks, supra note 8, at 647. 
57 Id. at 647 (alteration in original) (quoting Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply 
Ass’n, 349 N.W.2d 419, 425 (S.D. 1984)). But see Cleveland v. BDL Enters., 663 N.W.2d 212, 
220–25 (S.D. 2003) (holding that the state open court provision did not prevent the legis-
lature from enforcing statutes of limitation or statutes of repose). 
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pose is Ohio.58 Ohio courts have held that statutes of repose which 
“closed the door” on remedies before causes of action could accrue are 
unconstitutional.59 Similarly, the Arizona state courts have held statutes 
of repose to be inconsistent with the state constitution.60 Arizona’s Su-
preme Court has held that its state constitution guarantees the right to 
ªle and litigate actions in court as a “fundamental right.”61 Accordingly, 
the court has held that statutes of repose would violate equal protection 
under the state constitution, since they would discriminate against 
plaintiffs whose injuries had not arisen or had not been discovered be-
fore the repose period had run.62 In effect, the “abolition of a cause of 
action before injury has occurred,” or before the plaintiff is aware of 
his injury, has been declared an “abrogation” of a fundamental right 
afforded under the Arizona Constitution.63
 Nevertheless, statutes of repose have been held to be constitu-
tional by many jurisdictions,64 because “open courts” principles have 
not been interpreted the same way in all jurisdictions.65 For example, 
some state courts refrain from interfering with the legislature’s annul-
ment of a cause of action “if the theory on which the cause of action is 
based did not exist when the state adopted the constitutional mandate 
for open courts.”66 Other jurisdictions view their open courts provisions 
as protecting only vested rights so that “a citizen’s constitutional right 
to a day in court is not violated by a repose time bar because a right to a 
cause of action cannot vest after the time period runs.”67 Accordingly, 
the legislature retains the power to “abrogate a nonvested right.”68
 In addition, some statutes of repose apply to only one particular 
theory of liability, such as strict liability, “so that open courts provi-
sions are not violated because [other] remedies such as workers com-
pensation still exist.”69 Moreover, some state courts “give more defer-
                                                                                                                      
58 See Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform in 1998: The War Continues, 45 Clev. St. L. 
Rev. 539, 547 (1997). Some legal scholars have even hypothesized that “[a]ny statute of 
repose is too perverse to pass constitutional muster under Ohio law.” Id. at 570. 
59 Id. at 547. 
60 Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 979 (Ariz. 1984). 
61 Id. at 975. 
62 Id. at 967–79. 
63 Kenyon, 688 P.2d at 966; see Ariz. Const. art. 18, § 6 (1911) (“[t]he right of action to 
recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated . . . .”). 
64 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4][d], at 17-259. 
65 Baughman, supra note 40, at 682. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Hicks, supra note 8, at 645. 
69 Baughman, supra note 40, at 682. 
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ence to the state legislature and uphold repose statutes as legitimate 
measures that address reasonable goals.”70 There are also states that 
do not guarantee a fundamental right to bring actions for damages, 
thus enabling legislatures to “deªne, abolish and abrogate such rights 
with impunity so long as it acts reasonably.”71 Challenges to statutes of 
repose under the U.S. Constitution using “open courts” theories may 
also be unsuccessful, since the federal Constitution does not explicitly 
have such a provision.72 Moreover, there is little evidence to suggest 
that the current membership on the U.S. Supreme Court would “take 
the ‘activist’ role needed to create such a right.”73
 Illinois and Missouri have open courts provisions but have upheld 
statutes of repose, ªnding that they do not conºict because statutes of 
repose eliminate the cause of action itself rather than close off the 
courts to anyone.74 Even Alabama’s open courts provision may be over-
come by a statute of repose, although defendants must show that the 
law is substantially related to the eradication of a particular social evil.75
 In contrast, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire has examined 
whether statutes of repose are “substantially related to [a] legitimate 
legislative object” when determining if they violate important substan-
tive rights.76 New Hampshire has been a leader in applying a more 
stringent standard of review than other courts when evaluating the 
constitutionality of statutes of repose.77 It has been with “rare excep-
tion” that federal and state courts have applied standards of review 
that are more stringent than the rational basis test when determining 
the validity of statutes of repose.78 However, despite the widespread 
acceptance of statutes of repose by state and federal courts, the 
“[c]ourts continue to grapple with constitutional issues when deter-
mining whether to uphold and apply a repose statute so as to pre-
clude a cause of action before injury occurs . . . .”79 Courts also strug-
gle in cases where knowledge or discovery of the relationship between 
                                                                                                                      
70 Id. 
71 Kenyon v. Hammer, 688 P.2d 961, 965 (Ariz. 1984) (citing Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 
530 P.2d 53, 57 (Or. 1974)). 
72 Baughman, supra note 40, at 681. 
73 Werber, supra note 48, at 774. 
74 Adcock v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 654 N.E.2d 631, 635–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); 
Blaske v. Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 833 (Mo. 1991). 
75 Baugher v. Beaver Constr. Co., 791 So. 2d 932, 935–37 (Ala. 2000). 
76 Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 294–97 (N.H. 1983). 
77 See Hicks, supra note 8, at 640. 
78 Werber, supra note 48, at 768. 
79 Id. at 765. 
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the injury and the defendant’s conduct did not exist or occur before 
the end of the repose period.80
II. Common Justiªcations for the Enactment of Statutes of 
Repose and Their Relevance to Environmental Claims 
A. Justiªcations for Statutes of Repose 
 Numerous rationales exist to justify statutes of repose,81 separately 
from statutes of limitations.82 While applying a statute of limitations to 
bar a plaintiff’s claim might be justiªable on grounds that he had no 
excuse for failing to ªle his suit on time, there is no comparable ration-
ale for applying statutes of repose to time-bar suits.83 On a broad level, 
statutes of repose have derived justiªcation from considerations relat-
ing to the best economic interests of the public as a whole, and repre-
sent “substantive grants of immunity based on a legislative balance of 
the respective rights of potential plaintiffs and defendants struck by 
determining a time limit beyond which liability no longer exists.”84 A 
few main arguments stand out in support of statutes of repose.85
 The ªrst argument in favor of statutes of repose is built around 
the evidentiary difªculties in meeting the burden of proof when 
evaluating a defendant’s liability in court.86 With the passage of many 
years, the difªculty in locating or preserving reliable evidence to 
prove or disprove liability—especially for defects, negligence, dam-
ages, and potential defenses—increases, since evidence is often lost, 
memories fade, and witnesses can no longer be found.87
 The second argument justifying statutes of repose is premised 
upon a theme of fairness to defendants, suggesting that defendants 
should not suffer protracted liability or else their ability to “plan their 
affairs with a degree of certainty” would be impaired.88 In other words, 
legislatures have recognized a public interest in granting defendants 
immunity after a certain period of time has elapsed so that they may 
                                                                                                                      
80 Id. 
81 See Peacock, supra note 2, at 231–33. 
82 Eli J. Richardson, Eliminating the Limitations of Limitations Law, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 1015, 
1018 n.25 (1997). 
83 Id. 
84 First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
85 See Peacock, supra note 2, at 231–33. 
86 See id. 
87 Baughman, supra note 40, at 678–79; Peacock, supra note 2, at 231–33. 
88 Id. 
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conduct their activities with the “reasonable expectation” that they will 
not be liable for “ancient obligations.”89
 Proponents of statutes of repose also believe that with the passage 
of time, jurors will unjustly and improperly evaluate defendant liabil-
ity by holding defendants to safety standards and expectations that are 
based upon current technology and practices rather than those which 
existed at the time the defendants’ actions occurred.90 Similarly, de-
fendants worry that misuse or modiªcation of their products by plain-
tiffs that was unforeseeable at the time of manufacture “may be inap-
propriately judged foreseeable by a modern jury.”91
 Statutes of repose have also been intended to serve as a mecha-
nism for combating insurance premiums in the construction industry, 
the manufacturing industry, and in the medical profession.92 Not sur-
prisingly, insurance companies and “big business” have “typically com-
prise[d] the main motivating force behind adoption . . . of statutes of 
repose.”93 Insurance companies have insisted that time limits on liabil-
ity are necessary to provide defendants with affordable liability poli-
cies.94 The underlying theory is that “[p]redictable liability endpoints 
for businesses enable actuaries to more accurately calculate the risks 
that determine premium prices,” thereby increasing insurance policy 
options and stabilizing costs for defendants.95 Historically, bearing re-
sponsibility for “older products, latent medical problems, and ‘perma-
nent’ or durable improvements” exposed defendants to “abnormally 
long periods of potential liability and unusually large numbers of po-
tential plaintiffs.”96
                                                                                                                      
89 Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Mass. 1982); see Town of Weymouth v. James 
J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198 (Super. Ct. 1996); Note, Developments in the Law— 
Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1177, 1185 (1950) [hereinafter Statutes of Limita-
tions]. One court noted, a statute of repose “relieves defendants from worrying about liti-
gation in the far distant future.” Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 726 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (citing Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette Homes, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 611, 
613 (Mich. 1998)), rev’d on other grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000). 
90 Baughman, supra note 40, at 679. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 679–80; Hicks, supra note 8, at 632. 
93 Baughman, supra note 40, at 679–80. 
94 Id. at 679. For example, in the area of products liability, insurers have argued that 
“inºated prices and policy cancellations are most directly caused by the potential for 
inªnite manufacturer liability.” Id. 
95 Id. at 679–80. 
96 Hicks, supra note 8, at 632. 
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B. The Relevance of Statutes of Repose to Environmental Claims 
 An important question for defendants facing environmental litiga-
tion is whether they may take advantage of statutes of repose to avoid 
liability. Currently, few states have enacted general statutes of repose 
that defendants might invoke to broadly defend against claims for envi-
ronmental damage.97 Oregon has a general statute of repose, which 
eliminates a cause of action for negligent injuries ten years after the 
defendant acted or failed to act.98 The broad language of the Oregon 
statute appears applicable to a variety of legal claims, creating the pos-
sibility for application to environmental litigation.99 Oregon courts 
have supported this broad construction of the statute, ªnding it appli-
cable in cases of negligence, strict liability, and products liability 
claims.100
 Even though most states lack a generally applicable statute of re-
pose, various forms of repose statutes apply to particular claims and 
“pockets of liability.”101 For example, statutes of repose are commonly 
crafted for products liability, medical malpractice suits, and contractor 
liability for improvements to real property.102 In products liability litiga-
tion, an applicable statute of repose would typically “begin to run at the 
date of manufacture or ªrst sale to a consumer.”103 For home construc-
tion or improvements to real property, the applicable statutes of repose 
usually begin to run at the moment of the improvements’ opening for 
use or upon substantial completion.104 Real property statutes of repose 
typically prescribe a repose period ranging from seven to twelve 
years.105
 Massachusetts has a statute of repose that applies directly to im-
provements to real property.106 The law provides that tort actions for 
damages that arise out of the design, planning, construction, or gen-
                                                                                                                      
97 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1609. 
98 Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115 (2003). 
99 Id. 
100 Johnson v. Star Mach. Co., 530 P.2d 53, 57–60 (Or. 1974); Toxic Waste Litigation, su-
pra note 7, at 1609 n.38. 
101 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4][d], at 17-259; accord 
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1609. 
102 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4][d], at 17-259; accord 
Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1609. 
103 Peacock, supra note 2, at 226. 
104 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (2004); Hicks, supra note 8, at 631. 
105 Andrew D. Ness & Marcia G. Madsen, Trends in Contractor Liability for Hazardous 
Waste Cleanups: The Current Legal Environment, 22 Pub. Cont. L.J. 581, 591 (1993). 
106 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B. 
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eral administration of improvements to real property cannot be ªled 
“six years after the earlier of the dates of: (1) the opening of the im-
provement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement 
and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner.”107 Illinois 
has a similar real property statute of repose.108 However, the Illinois 
statute appears to extend beyond tortious conduct, reaching injuries 
arising out of acts or omissions in connection with improvements to 
real property.109 Virginia also has a statute of repose that applies to 
actions “for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily in-
jury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condi-
tion of an improvement to real property.”110
 Real property statutes of repose vary widely in their construc-
tion.111 Some real property statutes of repose, such as those in Con-
necticut and Florida, are more exclusive than others in that they mainly 
protect professionals including architects, contractors, and land sur-
veyors.112 Real property statutes of repose in other states “have a 
broader reach, protecting materialmen, laborers, and other workers 
participating in the construction.”113 Reacting to court decisions hold-
ing that statutes of repose violate equal protection rights, some legisla-
tures have broadened the group of defendants that come within the 
scope of real property statutes of repose.114 The most broadly crafted 
statutes of repose—such as those in Minnesota and Hawaii—are de-
signed to protect almost “everyone involved in the construction,” in-
cluding the “owners or persons in possession of the improvement.”115 It 
remains unclear, however, whether real property statutes of repose pro-
tect contractors who remediate environmental damage—entities that 
remedy hazardous or toxic contamination problems created by other 
individuals— who inadvertently worsen or cause further environmental 
injuries to plaintiffs.116
                                                                                                                      
107 Id. 
108 See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-214 (West 2002). 
109 Id. (“No action based upon tort, contract or otherwise may be brought against any 
person . . . after 10 years have elapsed from the time of such act or omission.”). 
110 Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-250 (2004). 
111 Ness & Madsen, supra note 105, at 591. 
112 Hicks, supra note 8, at 631 (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584a (West Supp. 
1984); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982)). 
113 Hicks, supra note 8, at 631 (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-50(5)(b)(9) (1983); Wis. 
Stat. Ann. § 893.155 (West 1983)). 
114 Hicks, supra note 8, at 631. 
115 Id. (citing Haw. Rev. Stat. § 657-8 (Supp. 1982); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 541.051 (West 
Supp. 1984)). 
116 Ness & Madsen, supra note 105, at 591. 
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C. Common Applications of Real Property Statutes of Repose 
 Across jurisdictions, real property statutes of repose have com-
monly been used in cases surrounding personal injuries, wrongful 
death actions, nuisance, and related property damage claims.117 Sulli-
van v. Iantosca illustrates the application of a real property statute of 
repose in Massachusetts.118 In Sullivan, the court considered whether a 
defendant building contractor was liable in negligence for building the 
plaintiff’s home on an improper landªll material that adversely af-
fected the foundation of the structure.119 However, the defects in the 
foundation did not appear for eight years.120 Because the six-year stat-
ute of repose had already run, the court upheld a lower court decision 
granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on negligence 
claims.121 In broad support of the defendant’s position, the court noted 
that, despite the fact that the plaintiff did not discover the cause of ac-
tion until after the repose period had run, the statute was to be applied 
as written.122 As construed by the court, the statute of repose forbid in-
quiry into “the fact that a plaintiff did not discover or reasonably could 
not have discovered the harm before the six-year period of the statute 
of repose expired.”123 Moreover, the court held that circumstances 
which would toll a relevant statute of limitations, such as fraudulent 
concealment, mental illness, minority, and common law estoppel would 
not modify the statute of repose or prevent its application.124
 Similarly, in Stanske v. Wazee Electric Co., a Colorado court held 
that the plaintiff’s personal injury claims against the defendant—who 
negligently installed an electrical system that injured the plaintiff— 
was barred by the state real property statute of repose, since the stat-
ute encompassed “all actions” related to improvements to real prop-
erty and the defendant’s installation of the electrical system qualiªed 
                                                                                                                      
117 See generally Gaggero v. County of San Diego, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (Ct. App. 2004); 
Stanske v. Wazee Elec. Co., 722 P.2d 402 (Colo. 1986); Olson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp., 556 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
118 See 569 N.E.2d 822, 823–26 (Mass. 1991). 
119 See id. at 823. 
120 See id. (stating that defects were discovered in 1986, but construction had ended in 
1978). 
121 See id. at 823–26. 
122 See id. at 823–24. 
123 Id. (citing Tindol v. Boston Hous. Auth., 487 N.E.2d 488, 490 (1986)). 
124 Sullivan, 569 N.E.2d at 823–24. 
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as such an improvement.125 The application of the Colorado real 
property statute of repose to personal injury cases was later echoed in 
Homestake Enterprises v. Oliver, in which the court held that the plain-
tiff’s personal injury action against the defendant construction com-
pany for its negligent testing and observation of a sprinkler system was 
barred by the statute of repose.126 Like Colorado, personal injury and 
wrongful death actions are covered by the Georgia real property stat-
ute of repose,127 and may even protect defendant manufacturers of 
defective materials from such suits if those materials were an integral 
or essential part of the improvement to real property so as to be con-
sidered “improvements” themselves.128
D. State Environmental Statutes and Statutes of Repose 
 In at least two jurisdictions, defendants facing claims under state 
environmental statutes have not successfully relied on statues of repose 
for relief from environmental liability.129 For example, in Town of Wey-
mouth v. James J. Welch & Co., a Massachusetts court was unwilling to ap-
ply the real property statute of repose to property damage claims re-
lated to contamination from hazardous substances under the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act.130 
The defendant contractor was sued over the improper installation of an 
oil tank—which resulted in leakage contamination—under the law 
which comprehensively covered property contamination from hazard-
ous substances.131 The plaintiff was unaware of the contamination for 
almost thirteen years following the installation of the tank.132 The de-
fendant argued that the contamination claims were tort actions subject 
to the six-year statute of repose for improvements to real property and 
that he was relieved from liability, since the six-year repose period had 
                                                                                                                      
125 See 722 P.2d 402, 405, 407 (Colo. 1986); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-104(1)(a) 
(2004) (previously codiªed at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-127 (1984) with a longer repose 
period). 
126 See 817 P.2d 979, 984 (Colo. 1991) (holding defendant liable for causing road icing 
that lead to plaintiff’s injury). 
127 Ga. Code. Ann. § 9-3-51 (West 1982). 
128 See Beall v. Inclinator Co. of Am., 356 S.E.2d 899, 900 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987). 
129 See Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198–200 (Su-
per. Ct. 1996); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1327–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1994). 
130 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 198–200. 
131 Id. at 197–98; see Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 21E, §§ 2, 5(a) (2004). 
132 James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 197. 
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already run.133 However, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and 
asserted that it would be inappropriate to characterize claims under the 
contamination statute as tort actions for purposes of applying the real 
property statute of repose.134 The court explained that doing so “would 
be unjust to victims of environmental pollution and spoliation of prop-
erty,” and would conºict with the purpose behind the contamination 
statute’s liberal discovery rule, to compensate the injured.135
 Similarly, New Jersey courts have held that the state real property 
statute of repose do not shield defendants from liability under the 
Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act),136 which covers con-
tamination claims related to the discharge of hazardous substances.137 
In Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Industries, the defendant sought protec-
tion under a real property statute of repose since it faced liability un-
der the Spill Act for improperly designing and installing heating oil 
tanks that leaked into the plaintiff’s groundwater and caused con-
tamination.138 The court held that under the Spill Act there was “no 
provision of any defense available . . . based on the passage of 
time.”139 In essence, the court stated that the environmental statute 
created a new cause of action that was “unrelated to any time bar at 
all” and beyond the scope and applicability of the statute of repose.140 
Finally, the court justiªed its holding—much like the James J. Welch & 
Co. court— by observing that the function and purpose of the Spill 
Act was to address the “grave public consequences of hazardous-
substance discharges that threaten the health and safety of everyone,” 
and that limiting liability through a repose statute would impair the 
statutory scheme and run afoul of legislative intent.141
 In contrast, Michigan courts have held that a statute of repose 
may bar an untimely ªling of claims brought under a state environ-
mental statute.142 In Shields v. Shell Oil Co., the plaintiff landowners 
purchased land on which Shell Oil Company had maintained under-
                                                                                                                      
133 Id. at 198. 
134 Id. at 198–200. 
135 Id. 
136 See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1325–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994) (explaining that defendant contractor’s negligent design and installation of 
heating oil tanks resulted in soil contamination and groundwater pollution). 
137 Id. at 1326 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10–23.11 (West 1988)). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 1327. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 1328. 
142 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 722, 724–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) rev’d on 
other grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000). 
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ground gasoline storage tanks.143 When Shell performed excavations 
to the land to remove the tanks, the surrounding soil became con-
taminated with gasoline, which was subsequently discovered by the 
plaintiff.144 Seeking recovery of response activity costs for the envi-
ronmental pollution, the plaintiff ªled an action under the Michigan 
Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA).145 
However, the court held that the NREPA claims were subject to a stat-
ute of repose that was meant to remove the “threat of litigation 
[from] haunting” defendants.146 This decision is controversial and 
may be subject to further litigation; the state supreme court later re-
viewed the case and vacated the decision because there were too many 
unanswered questions as to whether the statute of repose should be-
gin to run under the particular facts.147
 The next part of this Note will present an analysis of the argu-
ments that defendants and plaintiffs may use to either justify or pre-
vent the application of statutes of repose in an environmental context. 
These arguments may have important ramiªcations for both legal pol-
icy and public environmental policy, particularly with respect to iden-
tifying responsible parties with proper evidence, compensating the 
injured, and encouraging environmental responsibility and compli-
ance with environmental laws. 
III. Analysis of Statutes of Repose in Environmental Contexts 
A. Past Applications of Statutes of Repose to Environmental Claims 
 Improving land and real property poses a risk of creating envi-
ronmental harm, especially in light of the nature of the work involved 
and materials used.148 However, a defendant may face challenges in 
invoking a statute of repose to escape liability, as some courts have not 
allowed the use of statutes of repose for claims brought under envi-
ronmental statutes.149 Defendants may be able to justify the applica-
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. at 722. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 722–23. 
146 Id. at 727. 
147 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 621 N.W.2d 215, 215–16 (Mich. 2000). 
148 See generally Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 197–
200 (Super. Ct. 1996); Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 818 A.2d 330, 332–33 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 2002); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1327–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1994). 
149 See James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 198–200; Pitney Bowes, Inc., 649 A.2d at 
1327–28. 
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tion of statutes of repose for environmental injuries by analogizing to 
other types of claims and injuries that may involve environmental 
components, such as wrongful death and personal injury actions.150 
In tort litigation, for example, a plaintiff may assert that the defen-
dant was negligent in rendering improvements to real property, and 
that this negligence caused another person’s death, or physical or 
mental injuries.151
 Since courts have applied real property statutes of repose to free 
defendants of liability in these circumstances, defendants sued under 
environmental statutes may be able to successfully argue for the appli-
cation of statutes of repose in similar cases where the defendant’s en-
vironmental harm led to the plaintiff’s injuries.152 In convincing a 
court to apply statutes of repose where environmental injuries are in-
volved, defendants may argue that the causal relationship between 
their own conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries does not change when 
environmental effects play a role in the plaintiff’s injuries.153 In both 
scenarios, the defendant performs improvements to real property in 
such a way as to create a hazard that has a delayed harmful impact on 
the plaintiff. Therefore, regardless of whether the plaintiff was hurt by 
a defective structure,154 or was injured by contamination or pollu-
tion,155 the injuries arose in connection with the improvements to real 
property performed by the defendant. However, it has been noted 
that some environmental claims, such as those based upon toxic waste 
exposure, are “fundamentally different” from other causes of action 
because the latent manifestation of the injuries may cause “serious 
doctrinal and practical problems” for the victims to seek recovery.156
 Despite these issues, defendants may be able to rely on some 
precedent that applies real property statutes of repose to cases involv-
                                                                                                                      
150 See, e.g., McDonough v. Marr Scaffolding Co., 591 N.E.2d 1079, 1083–84 (Mass. 
1992) (holding that the Massachusetts real property statute of repose applies to wrongful 
death claims involving improvements to real property); Parent v. Stone & Webster Eng’g 
Corp., 556 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (Mass. 1990) (holding that the state real property statute of 
repose applies to personal injuries caused by defendant’s negligence). 
151 See McDonough, 591 N.E.2d at 1080–81; Parent, 556 N.E.2d at 1010–11. 
152 See, e.g., Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 722, 724–27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) 
rev’d on other grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000); Biniek, 818 A.2d at 332–33. 
153 Contra Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1603 (noting that toxic tort claims are 
“fundamentally different” from other causes of action). 
154 See McDonough, 591 N.E.2d at 1080–81. 
155 See Biniek, 818 A.2d at 332–33 (demonstrating how defendant’s negligent perform-
ance of services exposed plaintiffs to toxic contamination). 
156 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1603. 
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ing environmental harms.157 Recent cases in Mississippi and Washing-
ton have allowed a statute of repose afªrmative defenses in cases in-
volving environmental harms resulting from improvements to real 
property.158 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also ap-
plied real property statutes of repose to tort claims for both property 
damage and personal injuries involving environmental contamina-
tion.159 Similarly, a New Jersey court has held that the state real prop-
erty statute of repose may relieve defendants of liability for having 
caused injuries related to contamination and pollution resulting from 
fuel leakage, since the statute of repose was intended to cover such 
scenarios.160 Defendants in other jurisdictions may be able to apply 
similar logic to argue that the scope of real property statutes of repose 
includes environmental harms, hazards, and injuries resulting from 
making improvements to real property.161
 A recent California case illustrates the application of a real prop-
erty statute of repose involving environmental complications.162 In 
Gaggero v. County of San Diego, the California Court of Appeals 
afªrmed a lower court decision, which held that the plaintiff’s actions 
against the defendants for nuisance, negligence, trespass, and recov-
ery of toxic waste response costs were time-barred by a ten-year statute 
of repose.163 The statute covers actions arising out of latent defects in 
the design, construction, or operation of improvements to real prop-
erty that result in property damage.164 The plaintiff purchased a for-
mer landªll from the defendant and operated a nursery there for sev-
                                                                                                                      
157 See Biniek, 818 A.2d at 334–36 (discussing that New Jersey’s real property statute of 
repose would have applied to defendant’s negligent contamination of property had he 
qualiªed for protection under the statute); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 
1325, 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994) (explaining that parties would be “otherwise 
entitled to the beneªt of the ten-year repose” statute in cases involving construction that 
resulted in pollution and contamination, except for contribution claims under the “Spill 
Act”). 
158 See Scheinblum v. Lauderdale County Bd. of Supervisors, 350 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745–
47 (S.D. Miss. 2004); New Grade Int’l, Inc. v. Scott Techs., No. C03-2628RSM, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 26580, at *2, *14 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2004). 
159 See Conley v. Scott Prods., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 849, 850–51 (Mass. 1988) (afªrming a 
lower court decision which granted summary judgment under the state real property stat-
ute of repose, even though defendant negligently installed urea formaldehyde foam insu-
lation into plaintiff’s home, resulting in property damage and personal injuries). 
160 Biniek, 818 A.2d at 334. 
161 See id. 
162 See Gaggero v. County of San Diego, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (Ct. App. 2004). 
163 Id. at 389–90. 
164 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 337.15(a) (West 2004); Gaggero, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 389–90. 
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eral years.165 Over time, the plaintiff noticed environmental damage 
to his nursery structures caused by the former landªll, such as severe 
subsidence.166 Speciªcally, the plaintiff explained that the decomposi-
tion of materials deposited at the former landªll were producing 
methane gas and creating “void pockets in areas beneath the landªll 
covering.”167 However, the court held that because the defendant had 
made “improvement[s]” to the land while he was the owner and op-
erator of the property, the statute of repose applied to the property 
damage claims that arose out of the defendant’s conduct.168
 Statutes of repose are particularly important in asbestos litigation 
which has historically involved personal injury causes of action for 
property damage and for negative health effects associated with toxic 
exposure.169 Although asbestos litigation has been termed “the mother 
of all mass torts,”170 there is signiªcant controversy regarding when 
these lawsuits may be time-barred.171 Asbestos is a highly toxic material, 
the harmful environmental and health effects of which may not be dis-
covered until years after exposure.172 In particular, diseases associated 
with toxic asbestos exposure, such as asbestosis, mesothelioma, and 
other forms of cancer, have long latency periods that range from ten to 
forty years, and are not reasonably discoverable by examination while 
dormant.173
 For many years, actions for latent asbestos injuries were time-
barred before individuals “reasonably could have known they were 
injured.”174 To remedy this problem, state legislatures, state courts, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court began adopting the discovery rule to 
postpone the accrual of the cause of action until the plaintiff discov-
ered, or reasonably could have discovered, his latent injury.175 How-
ever, this remedy chieºy concerns determining the date that a cause 
of action has accrued to a plaintiff for purposes of applying statutes of 
                                                                                                                      
165 Gaggero, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 389–90. 
166 Id. at 390. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. at 389–90. 
169 Alex J. Grant, Note, When Does the Clock Start Ticking?: Apply the Statute of Limitations 
in Asbestos Property Damage Actions, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 695, 696–707 (1995). 
170 Id. at 696–98. 
171 See id. at 704–08. 
172 Id. at 707. 
173 Mehs, supra note 7, at 965–66. 
174 Grant, supra note 169, at 697. 
175 Id. at 697, 708; see Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169–70 (1949). 
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limitations and is silent as to statutes of repose.176 Thus, despite the 
concerns regarding the latent health and environmental effects of 
asbestos, statutes of repose have been applied in suits for toxic con-
tamination from asbestos exposure.177 In Olson v. Owens-Corning Fiber-
glas Corp., the Appellate Court of Illinois afªrmed a lower court deci-
sion that held that the plaintiff’s wrongful death action against 
defendants for having exposed her husband to asbestos for decades 
was barred by a state statute of repose.178 The plaintiff argued that the 
statute of repose should not be applied, since injuries from toxic ex-
posure to asbestos are latent and may not be discoverable until after 
the repose period.179 Although the court recognized that relieving 
defendants of liability before the cause of action has accrued would 
unfairly burden some plaintiffs, it was unwilling to create an excep-
tion to the statute of repose for latent asbestos-related injuries.180
B. Arguments Favoring the Application of Statutes of Repose to 
Environmental Claims 
 Defendants should take advantage of many of the policy 
justiªcations behind statutes of repose. Because improving real prop-
erty often involves numerous problems in “maintaining quality con-
trol over . . . designs before construction and safety standards after 
construction,”181 defendants could argue that statutes of repose are 
necessary to shield them from environmental claims arising from 
variables beyond their control,182 or for which the passage of time 
would make liability unfair due to the degradation of evidence “in 
long-delayed litigation.”183
 Establishing causation and “deªning the date of injury” for pur-
poses of determining culpability is also especially difªcult with envi-
                                                                                                                      
176 See Grant, supra note 169, at 696–97; see also Thompson, 337 U.S. at 169–71 (holding 
that “invasion of legal rights” occurs and statute of limitations begins to run when plaintiff 
is reasonably capable of discovering his injuries if they are latent); Mehs, supra note 7, at 
976. 
177 See Olson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 556 N.E.2d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). 
178 Id. at 719–21. 
179 Id. at 718. 
180 Id. at 719–21; Mehs, supra note 7, at 981. 
181 Hicks, supra note 8, at 633. 
182 See id. at 638 n.83. 
183 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-248 (discussing 
rationales for time-barring claims). For example, degradation of evidence may occur due 
to long-term exposure to the elements. 
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ronmental claims.184 Evidence that shows who is responsible for envi-
ronmental injuries may be confounded if there have been multiple 
owners or users of a property.185 This is particularly problematic for 
architects and similar professionals, since they have no control over 
the condition of the property or the construction work they have per-
formed once their work is complete.186 Over time, injuries may arise 
from “improper maintenance or failure to [make proper] repair[s]” 
by the property owners, “rather than inherent design defects in the 
original construction” as allegedly created by defendants.187 These 
defendants may have difªculty disproving evidence that ostensibly 
implicates their culpability for environmental hazards, but which may 
have actually been created by the actions of third-parties or by 
changes in the surrounding environment. 
 Related to evidentiary problems at trial is the problem of changing 
technologies and standards with respect to environmental harms.188 
Practices that may have previously been considered safe in an industry 
may later be found to carry grave environmental consequences.189 Le-
gal standards also change over time.190 Courts have recognized this re-
ality, noting that “the standards for architectural performance as well as 
building codes in effect could have changed signiªcantly in the inter-
vening years, and it would be difªcult to establish the standard of care 
of a reasonably prudent architect at the time the design services were 
rendered . . . .”191 Therefore, at trial, defendant architects and contrac-
tors face the possibility that their land improvements—and the ensuing 
environmental consequences—will be evaluated according to current 
                                                                                                                      
184 Grant, supra note 169, at 705; see Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1617–18 (de-
scribing the difªculties in establishing causation in environmental claims, and particularly 
toxic waste injuries, since the land involved may have changed ownership or control many 
times before injuries occurred). 
185 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1617–18. 
186 Hicks, supra note 8, at 638 n.83; see Yarbro v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 655 P.2d 822, 
825–26 (Colo. 1983). 
187 Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 825–26. 
188 See Arthur A. Schulcz, Comment, Recovering Asbestos Abatement Costs, 10 Geo. Mason 
U. L. Rev. 451, 452–54 (1988) (discussing the wide use of asbestos in industry and the 
increased awareness of its risks as time passed and medical studies were conducted). 
189 See Connaughton, supra note 24, at 514–15 (1989) (discussing the standard practice 
of using asbestos in buildings such as schools); Mehs, supra note 7, at 965 (“Only recently 
has society become aware of the dangers to human health and life associated with using 
one of the most dangerous materials of nature.”). 
190 Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of Repose and The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Time for a New 
Interpretation, 32 Conn. L. Rev. 1027, 1031 (2000) (discussing changing legal standards as 
to safety and design speciªcations of products). 
191 Yarbro, 655 P.2d at 826 n.5. 
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legal, technological, and environmental considerations rather than 
those which existed at the time of the conduct in question.192
 In this regard, the “attitudes of juries towards appropriate levels of 
safety” in design, construction, and performance of services at the time 
of trial may reºect safety and environmental considerations that were 
once thought unnecessary or even unforeseeable.193 This implies that 
defendants may not be able to trust that taking appropriate environ-
mental safety measures by today’s standards would adequately defend 
them against future liability. As a result, defendants might have “great 
difªculty in predicting and planning for future liabilities.”194 Moreover, 
even if one argues that the threat of unpredictably-imposed liability by 
future juries may encourage meticulous environmental safety practices 
among architects and contractors, they would still have no reasonable 
way to conform their present conduct to future, unknown environ-
mental standards to which they will ultimately be held at trial.195 Thus, 
statutes of repose help ensure the use of environmental standards that 
were foreseeable to defendants at the time they acted.196
 Additionally, it may be “wise public policy to minimize unreliable 
fact-ªnding” in environmental litigation by applying statutes of re-
pose.197 By functioning to ensure good evidence is presented at trials, 
statutes of repose—like statutes of limitations—are consistent with 
society’s interests in preserving a reliable fact-ªnding justice system.198 
As one commentator has noted, “[s]ociety and the judiciary are pri-
marily concerned with the difªculty of proof in older cases as well as 
the identiªcation of fraudulent claims in such cases.”199 Society has an 
interest in bringing the proper perpetrators of environmental harms 
                                                                                                                      
192 See Kulbaski, supra note 190, at 1032–33. 
193 Id. at 1031. 
194 Id. 
195 See id. 
196 See id. at 1031–33 (discussing how statutes of repose increase the likelihood that de-
fendants will be held to safety standards which existed at the time they acted rather than 
those which they could not foresee). 
197 Richardson, supra note 82, at 1021. 
198 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944) 
(“by preventing . . . claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, 
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared”); Richardson, supra note 82, at 
1021. 
199 Mehs, supra note 7, at 983. 
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to justice,200 which may make individuals environmentally conscious, 
responsible, and compliant with the law.201
C. Statutory Language and Composition 
 Statutory language is an important element in determining 
whether the defendant’s conduct comes within a statute of repose,202 
and what types of claims are covered.203 Most commonly, defendants 
will have to show that the alleged conduct giving rise to the environ-
mental harm is within the scope of the statutes.204 For example, where 
a statute uses such wording, defendants will have to prove that their 
conduct qualiªes as an “improvement to real property” within the 
meaning of the relevant statute of repose.205 A majority of courts have 
adopted the view that, in determining whether the defendant’s conduct 
constitutes an “improvement,” factors such as whether the construction 
“enhances the use of the property, involves the expenditure of labor or 
money, is more than mere repair or replacement, adds to the value of 
the property, and is permanent in nature” shall be considered.206
1. “Improvements” to Real Property 
 Using the deªnition of “improvements” above, defendants can 
likely present their work as constituting improvements under statutes of 
repose, especially where their services involved a “‘complex system of 
components.’”207 Courts have focused on each component of the de-
fendant’s work as part of a “system” of improvements.208 If defendants 
can show that a particular “component” of a qualiªed improvement 
should be characterized as an “integral part” of that improvement, then 
                                                                                                                      
200 See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1326–28 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1994). 
201 See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1603 (noting that where environmental in-
juries go uncompensated, dangerous environmental activities may be undeterred). 
202 See Rosenberg v. Town of N. Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 666 (N.J. 1972). 
203 See Ness & Madsen, supra note 105, at 591. 
204 Rosenberg, 293 A.2d at 666. 
205 Travelers Ins. Co. v. Guardian Alarm Co., 586 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998); Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 818 A.2d 330, 334–35 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). 
206 Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Elevator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 508 (8th Cir. 1983); see 
Collins v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 861 F.2d 1364, 1365 (5th Cir. 1988); Travelers Ins. Co., 586 
N.W.2d at 762. 
207 Adair v. Koppers Co., 741 F.2d 111, 115 (6th Cir. 1984) (quoting Mullis v. S. Co. 
Servs., 296 S.E.2d 579, 584 (Ga. 1982)); Pendzsu v. Beazer E., Inc., 557 N.W.2d 127, 132 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996). 
208 Adair, 741 F.2d at 115. 
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the component itself will be considered an “improvement to real prop-
erty” under the relevant statute of repose.209 This suggests that a par-
ticular component or aspect of the defendant’s work—-which caused 
the plaintiff’s environmental injuries—-may qualify as an improvement 
even if it would not have otherwise been an improvement when viewed 
in isolation. 
 Because some courts have adopted this system-based view, plain-
tiffs in those jurisdictions may have to negate the view that their inju-
ries arose from components of work that were part of a system in or-
der to invalidate application of the statute of repose.210 However, this 
system-based view is logical when considering the statute’s application 
to environmental injuries, since improvements made upon real prop-
erty frequently do consist of a set or system of improvements “to 
artiªcially extract each component from an improvement to real 
property and view it in isolation would be an unrealistic and impracti-
cal method of determining what is an improvement to real prop-
erty.”211 Therefore, as long as defendants render each component of 
their work as part of a scheme or system of improvements to real 
property, they increase their chances that courts will view their liability 
for environmental injuries as within the purview of statutes of re-
pose.212
 In contrast, merely replacing building structures, such as under-
ground gasoline tanks, may not qualify for protection as an improve-
ment, where the items have a “ªnite useful period for use.”213 Merely 
removing structures from land is also unlikely to qualify as an im-
provement, since the term generally denotes a “product, object, or 
some other tangible item that remains on the real property” after the 
work has been ªnished.214 To circumvent this, however, defendants 
may argue that, to the extent making replacements or removing struc-
tures is part of a set or system of improvements to real property, this 
conduct should be considered an improvement, since some courts 
have held that “the work must be considered in light of the system” 
and not just on an individual basis.215
                                                                                                                      
209 See Pitsch v. ESE Mich., Inc., 593 N.W.2d 565, 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Travelers 
Ins. Co., 586 N.W.2d at 762. 
210 See Adair, 741 F.2d at 115; Mullis, 296 S.E.2d at 584. 
211 Mullis, 296 S.E.2d at 584; see Adair, 741 F.2d at 115; Pendzsu, 557 N.W.2d at 132. 
212 See Adair, 741 F.2d at 115; Mullis, 296 S.E.2d at 584; Pendzsu, 557 N.W.2d at 132. 
213 Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 818 A.2d 330, 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002). 
214 Pitsch v. ESE Mich., Inc., 593 N.W.2d 565, 577 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999). 
215 Pendzsu, 557 N.W.2d at 132. 
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 Once it is established that the defendant made improvements to 
real property within the meaning of the particular state statute of re-
pose, a variety of jurisdictions require a showing that the defendant’s 
injurious conduct relate to the design, planning, construction, super-
vision, or general administration of that improvement to real prop-
erty.216 It is therefore in a potential defendant’s interests to carefully 
examine his activities, so as to take appropriate steps to ensure that 
the improvements he performs upon a property can be properly 
characterized as ªtting one of the above criteria. For example, liability 
arising out of an improvement to real property is unlikely to be con-
sidered related to the improvement’s design where the defendant did 
not exercise “‘substantial control over [its] design.’”217 Such a sce-
nario may resemble a situation in which the defendant has installed a 
widely manufactured product or device onto the plaintiff’s property 
but neither had substantial control of the product’s design, nor the 
design of its arrangement, placement, or function on the property.218
2. Type of claim 
 In light of the variation in the statutory language among jurisdic-
tions,219 it is important to examine whether a particular environ-
mental claim is covered by the real property statute of repose. Con-
sider, for example, harmful toxic contamination resulting from the 
defendant’s negligent performance of improvements to real prop-
erty.220 If defendants in Massachusetts were to invoke the state real 
property statute of repose during litigation, they may only be able to 
escape environmental liability that is grounded in tort law, since the 
statute of repose only addresses “[a]ction[s] of tort . . . arising out of 
any deªciency or neglect” in rendering improvements to real prop-
erty.221 In contrast, under the broader statutory language of the Illi-
nois statute of repose, a wider range of environmental claims may be 
covered, since the statute encompasses actions “based upon tort, con-
                                                                                                                      
216 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584a(a) (West 2005); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 
260, § 2B (2004); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-1.1 (West 2000 & Supp. 2005). 
217 Biniek, 818 A.2d at 335 (quoting Brown v. Cent. Jersey Power & Light Co., 394 A.2d 
397, 402 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)). 
218 Id. at 335–36 (ªnding that defendant did not have control over the design of a gas 
tank it was installing or the piping system in which it was being installed, since the system 
was already in existence). 
219 See Ness & Madsen, supra note 105, at 591. 
220 See Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197 (Super. Ct. 
1996). 
221 Mass Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (2004). 
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tract or otherwise.”222 Defendants in jurisdictions similar to Illinois 
may be able to exploit the broader statutory language, which could be 
construed to encompass a variety of legal claims that extend beyond 
the claims listed in the statute.223
D. Arguments Against Application and Public Policy Concerns 
 As a matter of environmental policy, however, courts and legisla-
tures should give more attention to the effects of statutes of repose in 
environmental contexts, and should consider amending state laws to 
limit their application in such circumstances.224
1. Latency and Environmental Injuries 
 Even if statutes of repose protect some important evidentiary, 
judicial, and economic interests on behalf of defendants,225 broadly 
applying statutes of repose to environmental claims may undermine 
the concept of fairness in our justice system, since some plaintiffs with 
latent injuries—such as toxic waste victims—would have their claims 
“systematically barred . . . on the merits.”226 The plight of victims of 
latent diseases from environmental harms “highlight[] the shortcom-
ings” of rules that extinguish claims before the plaintiffs had a rea-
sonable opportunity to discover their injuries.227 Thus, courts and leg-
islatures should recognize that defendants who would “otherwise be 
liable for generating and tortiously” creating environmental hazards 
should not escape liability simply for being fortunate that the hazards 
and injuries were latent in nature.228
 For example, statutes of repose would frequently bar environ-
mental claims involving serious illnesses, since they “characteristically 
set time limitations that . . . are shorter than the average latency pe-
riod for cancer and other diseases.”229 Thus, a person who has been 
exposed to hazardous contaminants because of the defendant’s negli-
gent performance of services “may learn that she has developed leu-
                                                                                                                      
222 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-214(b) (West 2002). 
223 See id. 
224 See Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1605 (arguing that legislatures should 
avoid enacting statutes of repose for particular environmental claims such as toxic waste 
injuries). 
225 See Peacock, supra note 2, at 230–32. 
226 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1607. 
227 Grant, supra note 169, at 697. 
228 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1607. 
229 Id. at 1609. 
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kemia . . . but may not connect her disease with exposure” in time to 
ªle a sustainable claim.230 Even more concerning, however, is the fact 
that the latency of the victims illness may result in the victim remain-
ing unaware of the environmental harms; moreover, the scientiªc 
community might be ignorant of the connection between the envi-
ronmental harms and health consequences until it is too late.231
2. Public Policy Concerns 
 The problems of applying statutes of repose to environmental 
claims extends beyond a determination of whether injuries are latent. 
Granting defendants a substantive right to escape liability for their mis-
treatment of the environment would be to give them a free pass for 
creating harms that retain a public character because of the intercon-
nection between the environment and the people which inhabit it.232 
The protective functions of environmental law and regulation may be 
undermined when defendants are aware that their potential liability for 
producing foreseeable environmental hazards and consequential inju-
ries would be absolutely extinguished on a particular date.233
 In effect, the limits that statutes of repose provide may empower 
contractors to plan and execute their construction activities with less 
caution toward the safety of clients and greater disrespect for poten-
tial environmental consequences, in the “hope that few claims will 
arise . . . before the statutory period ends.”234 If environmental inju-
ries remain uncompensated, dangerous environmental activities will 
remain undeterred.235 Accordingly, despite arguments that highlight 
the beneªts of statutes of repose, the “fairness and efªciency costs of 
systematically barring actions and insulating [defendants] from envi-
ronmental liability” are too high for society to bear.236
                                                                                                                      
230 Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 54–55 (1993) (discuss-
ing how time limitations may preclude actions in court). 
231 Id. 
232 See First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 
1989); Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and 
society, at xxiv (3d ed. 2004) (“‘Everything is connected to everything else’”). 
233 Peacock, supra note 2, at 249; Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1602–04 (dis-
cussing the subversive effect that statutes of repose can have in tort law and products liabil-
ity settings). 
234 Peacock, supra note 2, at 249. 
235 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1603. 
236 Id. at 1610. 
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E. Applying Statutes of Repose to State Environmental Statutes: A Look at 
Arguments For and Against Application 
 The fact that some courts have refused to apply statutes of repose 
to certain environmental claims indicates that they have recognized 
that statutes of repose in an environmental context may be “contrary to 
principles of fairness.”237 In particular, these courts believe that apply-
ing statutes of repose could “impair the statutory scheme” of state envi-
ronmental remediation laws, which are designed to prevent “the grave 
public consequences” of environmental harms by ensuring that no re-
sponsible party is excused.238 Moreover, these environmental remedia-
tion statutes are designed to illuminate environmental policy and im-
prove the government’s ability to respond to environmental hazards.239 
Thus, the public good may be served by avoiding the application of 
statutes of repose to particular environmental claims—such as those 
brought under state environmental remediation statutes similar to the 
Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention Act,240 
the New Jersey’s Spill Compensation and Control Act,241 or the Michi-
gan environmental remediation statutes.242 States could more effec-
tively enforce environmental protection laws by threatening defendants 
with having to pay for environmental response costs for their miscon-
duct.243
 At least one court has refused to apply a statute of repose to a 
state environmental remediation statute by arguing that the limita-
tions period prescribed in the remediation statute was intended by 
the legislature to exclusively govern whether claims shall be heard in 
court.244 The court held that application of a statute of repose would 
                                                                                                                      
237 Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198 (Super. Ct. 
1996). 
238 Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). 
239 Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Mass 1990). 
240 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, §§ 2, 5(a) (2004). 
241 See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 58:10 to 23.11 (West 1992). 
242 See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 324.20126 (West 1999 & Supp. 2005). 
243 Nassr v. Commonwealth, 477 N.E.2d 987, 992 (Mass. 1985) (noting that under a 
Massachusetts environmental remediation statute, parties responsible for pollution shall 
pay the costs of cleanup); Pitsch v. ESE Mich., Inc., 593 N.W.2d 565, 573–74 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1999) (discussing the purposes of the Michigan Environmental Response Act as par-
alleling those of the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation & 
Liability Act). 
244 Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198–200 (Super. 
Ct. 1996) (holding that the purpose of the § 11A limitations period in the state environ-
mental statute would be undermined if the state statute of repose were applied). 
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undermine the state’s liberal discovery rule, since the statute of re-
pose would have “a substantially greater impact on barring litigation 
than would a statute of limitations.”245 Moreover, the court held that 
the absence of language supporting a repose period in the environ-
mental statute suggested legislative intent that the limitations pe-
riod—with its liberal discovery rule—was to be the exclusive time-
barring mechanism.246
 However, the logic behind this holding is vulnerable to attacks. 
First, defendants may argue that statutes of repose should apply to 
claims based upon state environmental statutes where the statute of 
repose’s language is broad.247 For example, if the statute of repose 
were to specify that it shall apply to actions “based upon tort, contract 
or otherwise,”248 defendants may argue that claims brought under 
environmental statutes could be said to fall within the broad “or oth-
erwise” category of claims listed in the statute, especially where nei-
ther the statute of repose nor the particular environmental statute in 
question state to the contrary. Conversely, in jurisdictions where the 
statute of repose is primarily applicable to actions based upon tort—
such as Massachusetts—defendants may have to categorize the envi-
ronmental statutory claims in question as claims grounded in tort in 
order for the statute of repose to be relevant.249
 Defendants may also argue that, despite the desirability of main-
taining and enforcing a liberal discovery rule in environmental stat-
utes to protect plaintiffs, displacing a statute of repose with such a 
limitations period is inappropriate given the disparate natures of stat-
utes of repose and statutes of limitations.250 “Statutes of limitation . . . 
are primarily instruments of public policy and of court management” 
by both “managing the progress of cases” and “granting or denying 
access to [the state’s] courts.”251
                                                                                                                      
245 Id. at 199. 
246 Id. at 198–200. 
247 See 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-214(b) (West 2002) (containing the phrase “or oth-
erwise” to broaden the statute beyond the enumerated causes of action). 
248 Id. 
249 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B (2004) (referencing only “actions of tort” as subject 
to the statute of repose); see James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 198 (holding that the 
state environmental statute in question did not “sound in tort,” and thus the statute of 
repose was inapplicable). 
250 Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327–28 (Va. 1987); see James J. Welch & 
Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 198–200 (rejecting the applicability of the statute of repose given 
that the relevant environmental statute contained a limitations period). 
251 Goad v. Celotex Corp., 831 F.2d 508, 511 (4th Cir. 1987). 
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 In contrast, statutes of repose are intended to “relieve potential 
defendants from anxiety over liability for acts committed long ago.”252 
They are substantive deªnitions of the defendant’s rights to escape 
liability, and are substantive laws which “reºect a State’s determina-
tion of the proper relationship between the people and property 
within its boundaries.”253 Therefore, if courts displace statutes of re-
pose with statutes of limitations and discovery rules, they would be 
displacing defendants’ substantive rights concerning liability with 
mere procedural rules for judicial efªciency. The inherent differences 
between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose suggest that the 
procedure by which plaintiffs ªle lawsuits under statutes of limitations 
exists separately from defendants’ substantive right to avoid liability 
under statutes of repose.254 Indeed, statutes of limitations and statutes 
of repose coexist and may even be created in the same legislation.255
 In addition, the fact that an environmental statute contains its 
own limitations period with a liberal discovery rule, but does not ref-
erence a repose period, need not suggest a legislative intent to dis-
pense with statutes of repose.256 Statutes of repose, like discovery 
rules, also protect important legal and social policy interests, and rep-
resent “a conscious policy decision that . . . defendants deserve the 
peace of mind that comes with a close-ended limitations period.”257 
These interests are consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that 
the right of defendants “to be free of stale claims in time comes to 
prevail over the right to prosecute them.”258 Moreover, no true legal 
conºict exists between statutes of repose and statutes of limitations— 
even those with liberal discovery rules—since statutes of repose 
merely function as a “cap” on statutes of limitations.259 Thus, defen-
dants could argue that, if a particular environmental statute is to be 
                                                                                                                      
252 Id. at 511. 
253 Id.; Stevenson, supra note 15, at 334 n.38. 
254 See First United Methodist Church v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 882 F.2d 862, 866 (4th Cir. 
1989). 
255 See O’Brien v. Hazelet & Erdal, 299 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Mich. 1980) (describing a 
state statute as both a statute of limitation and a statute of repose). 
256 Contra Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198–200 
(Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting the applicability of the statute of repose to an environmental 
statute since a limitations period was provided for and no repose period was mentioned in 
the statute). 
257 Grant, supra note 169, at 728. 
258 Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944). 
259 Leslie Calkins O’Toole, Note, Wilder v. Amatex Corp.: A First Step Toward Ameliorat-
ing the Effect of Statutes of Repose on Plaintiffs with Delayed Manifestation Diseases, 64 N.C. L. 
Rev. 416, 417 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). 
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exempt from statutes of repose, then this exclusion should be based 
on reasons other than the mere presence of its own speciªc statute of 
limitations and discovery rule or lack of speciªc repose language.260
 In response to these arguments, plaintiffs may assert that “[t]he 
primary goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and give effect 
to the Legislature’s intent when it enacted a provision.”261 Accord-
ingly, it is appropriate for courts to “look to the object of the statute, 
the harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable con-
struction which best accomplishes the statute’s purpose.”262 Using this 
analysis, refusing to apply statutes of repose to environmental statutes 
is justiªable, particularly in instances where the legislature speciªcally 
mandates a liberal discovery rule within the statute itself.263 Thus, sub-
jecting those statutory environmental claims to a statute of repose 
could be contrary to the apparent intent of the legislature to create a 
speciªc cause of action that accrues when the plaintiff “‘knew or, in 
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known, of the in-
jury.’”264 Since statutes of repose eliminate a cause of action, they 
conºict with the goals of the discovery rule in ensuring that “a plain-
tiff’s claim does not expire before the plaintiff is aware of its exis-
tence.”265
 Additionally, plaintiffs may argue that statutes of repose must not 
apply to environmental remediation statutes, because doing so would 
frustrate the purposes of promoting environmental wellness and relief 
for the injured.266 Plaintiffs may also argue that, consistent with rules of 
statutory interpretation, environmental remediation statutes create pri-
vate environmental causes of action so speciªc that they were likely in-
tended to be exempt from, or should not be invalidated by, statutes of 
                                                                                                                      
260 But see James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 198–200. 
261 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 724 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) rev’d on other 
grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000). 
262 In re Forfeiture of $5,264, 439 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Mich. 1989) (citations omitted); 
Shields, 604 N.W.2d at 724. 
263 See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21E, § 11A(4) (2004) (enabling plaintiffs to ªle actions to 
recover reimbursement, contribution, or equitable shares of response costs within three 
years of when the plaintiff “discovers or reasonably should have discovered” that the de-
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& Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. at 197–200. 
264 Grant, supra note 169, at 708 (quoting Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Armstrong World 
Indus., Inc., 627 N.E.2d 1033, 1037 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)). 
265 Id. at 707–08 (citing Mehs, supra note 7, at 974). 
266 See Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 95 (D. Mass 
1990); Pitsch v. ESE Mich., Inc., 593 N.W.2d 565, 573–74 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Pitney 
Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325, 1326–27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
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repose, which speak in more general terms.267 Indeed, it is “well-
settled” that where two statutes cover a given subject matter, the more 
speciªc statute will prevail over the more general statute, which other-
wise might apply.268 Therefore, plaintiffs might successfully assert that 
environmental statutes more speciªcally cover the injuries in question 
than do statutes of repose, and should therefore operate independently 
and without interference from statutes of repose.269
F. Balancing the Burden and a Potential for Compromise 
 In the American justice system, “[t]he law imposes on a plaintiff, 
armed with knowledge of an injury and its cause, a duty to diligently 
pursue the resulting legal claim.”270 Because statutes of repose may 
bar claims before injuries are even discovered, the application of stat-
utes of repose to environmental injuries effectively requires that 
plaintiffs also perform their own due diligence and discover injuries 
before the repose period has ended. However, as some commentators 
have noted, “defendants, rather than innocent victims, should suffer 
the inconveniences” resulting from environmental harms they have 
caused.271 Accordingly, the burden to evaluate the environmental 
safety of improvements to real property ex ante should not be shifted 
from defendants to plaintiffs. For example, had the plaintiff in Shields 
v. Shell Oil Co. tested his soil sooner—thereby discovering the con-
tamination caused by the defendant—he may have been able to ªle a 
claim before the end of the repose period.272 In that case, the statute 
of repose effectively penalized the plaintiff for merely having contin-
ued in the course of his own activities on the assumption that the de-
fendant had not acted adversely to his interests.273 However, expecting 
                                                                                                                      
267 Pitney Bowes, Inc., 649 A.2d at 1327 (holding that it is “self-evident” that the purpose 
of the Spill Act as an environmental remediation statute “would be defeated” if a statute of 
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268 State v. State Employees’ Review Bd., 687 A.2d 134, 143 (Conn. 1997) (internal 
quotations omitted); Tolchin v. Shell Oil Co., No. X03CV970510328S, 2004 Conn. Super. 
LEXIS 2203, at *8 ( July 30, 2004). 
269 See Tolchin, 2004 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2203, at *7–10 (stating that a state environ-
mental statute was more directly applicable to the plaintiff’s claims pertaining to hazard-
ous pollution than was the statute of repose invoked by defendants). 
270 Moll v. Abbott Labs., 506 N.W.2d 816, 830 (Mich. 1993). 
271 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1607–08. 
272 Shields v. Shell Oil Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 722, 727 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) rev’d on 
other grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 (Mich. 2000). 
273 See id. at 722–23. For a period of years after the purchase of the property from the 
defendant, the plaintiff made use of his property by installing new tanks underground. Id. 
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plaintiffs will take afªrmative steps to avoid environmental injuries 
may be unreasonable or unrealistic, because this presupposes that 
plaintiffs are capable of discovering these injuries through reasonable 
means and in time for ªling.274
 What, then, can be done? In balancing the interests of plaintiffs 
and defendants in terms of environmental injuries and liability, state 
legislatures should consider modifying their statutes of repose in a 
way that both enables defendants to be sheltered from obligations 
long passed and gives plaintiffs a more reasonable opportunity to ob-
tain relief for their injuries, whether overt or latent. Some states al-
ready have provisions built into their statutes of repose which provide 
plaintiffs with some protection from the harsh effects of repose time-
bars.275 For example, the Connecticut real property statute of repose 
states that, although actions arising out of deªcient performance of 
improvements to real property must be brought within seven years of 
substantial completion of the improvements, plaintiffs shall have one 
additional year to bring their claims if their injuries—-personal, prop-
erty, or wrongful death—-are discovered in the ªnal year before the 
claims would be time-barred.276 Similarly, the Illinois real property 
statute of repose provides that if before the ten year repose period has 
run, the plaintiff discovers his or her injuries, he or she will have no 
less than four years to bring the suit.277 Florida’s real property statute 
of repose takes a more complex approach and explicitly accounts for 
latent defects or injuries.278 In Florida, the four year repose period for 
actions arising out of the performance of improvements to real prop-
erty begins to run when the owner takes possession of the property or 
the work is completed.279 However, if the injuries are latent, the re-
pose period will instead begin to run when the plaintiff discovers, or 
should have discovered, the injury.280 Nevertheless, the statute says 
                                                                                                                      
It was only when the plaintiff moved to sell the property did he discover that the defen-
dant’s prior conduct contaminated his land. See id. 
274 See Mehs, supra note 7, at 965. For example, certain latent injuries associated with 
toxic exposure in the local environment may not be detectable by a routine examination. 
Id. 
275 These states include Connecticut, Florida, and Illinois. See infra notes 276–78. 
276 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 52-584a(a) to (b) (West 2005). 
277 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/13-214(b) (West 2003). 
278 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 2002 & Supp. 2006). 
279 Id. 
280 Id. 
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that the suit will be time-barred ªfteen years after the owner takes 
possession or the work is completed.281
 Providing plaintiffs with additional time to ªle their suits beyond 
the repose period may abate the danger of suits being time-barred be-
fore injuries have accrued. However, in order for such modiªcations to 
statutes of repose to apply this beneªt to plaintiffs, the additional time 
afforded would have to be signiªcant, based upon a timetable during 
which environmental injuries are likely to become apparent. Thus, leg-
islatures should not only adopt modiªcations to statutes of repose that 
provide extra time for plaintiffs to ªle suits once they have discovered 
their injuries, but should also consider lengthening or enacting larger 
repose periods from the start, so as to reºect the latent expression of 
many environmentally-caused injuries. This policy would be consistent 
with the current goals of statutes of repose, such as preventing the use 
of degraded evidence, and avoid the imposition of unforeseeable stan-
dards.282 If the goals of statutes of repose are important concerns in 
environmental litigation, shielding defendants following a longer re-
pose period might be given greater legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
 Statutes of repose are capable of enabling defendants to escape 
some of the particular “perils” of environmental litigation.283 There is 
precedent that supports the notion that where the defendant’s injuri-
ous conduct arises out of making improvements to real property, a 
state’s real property statute of repose is relevant and applicable to the 
litigation, depending on the type of environmental claims involved and 
the particulars of the statutory language. In protecting their respective 
interests, plaintiffs and defendants should be aware that case law sup-
ports the application of statutes of repose to tort claims with environ-
mental components, such as those involving property damage and per-
sonal injuries.284 In contrast, there is some precedent for precluding 
                                                                                                                      
281 Id. 
282 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-248; Kulbaski, su-
pra note 190, at 1031. 
283 Peter J. Lynch et al., On the Frontier of Toxic Tort Liability: Evolution or Abdication?, 6 
Temp. Envtl. L. & Tech. J. 1, 28 (1987). 
284 See e.g., Gaggero v. County of San Diego, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 388 (Ct. App. 2004); Con-
ley v. Scott Prods., Inc., 518 N.E.2d 849, 850–51 (Mass. 1988); Scheinblum, v. Lauderdale 
County Bd. of Supervisors, 350 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745–47 (S.D. Miss. 2004); New Grade Int’l, 
Inc., v. Scott Techs., No. C03-2628RSM, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26580, at *2, *14 (W.D. Wa. 
Nov. 30, 2004); Biniek v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 818 A.2d 330, 334–36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
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the application of statutes of repose to claims falling under state envi-
ronmental remediation statutes.285 However, although these courts 
have refused to apply statutes of repose to statutory environmental 
claims,286 defendants are not without legal and policy justiªcations to 
convince courts otherwise. These arguments include the presentation 
of good evidence at trial,287 the appropriateness of particular legal 
standards enforced upon defendants,288 and the discrete functions of 
statutes of repose as compared to statutes of limitations.289 Moreover, 
plaintiffs must also be mindful that in most jurisdictions, it will be 
difªcult for them to bring a constitutional challenge to defeat statutes 
of repose, since they are widely held to be constitutional and not con-
trary to fundamental rights.290 This will likely remain the subject of con-
troversy in latent injury cases in which the plaintiff’s recovery may be 
time-barred before their injuries have been discovered.291
 The debate most fundamental to the applicability of statutes of 
repose in environmental litigation is that which embodies “the 
conºict that arises between the policy goals of statutes of repose and 
the policy goals of recovery.”292 While some argue that fairness re-
quires imposition of liability upon defendants for the environmental 
harms that they have caused to innocent plaintiffs,293 others will argue 
that defendants deserve the peace of mind that they will not have to 
answer to liability arising long ago when environmental, technologi-
cal, or legal circumstances were different.294 A viable option to simul-
                                                                                                                      
Div. 2002) (suggesting that New Jersey’s real property statute of repose is applicable to 
claims of negligent contamination of property); 
285 See generally Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, (Super. 
Ct. 1996); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., 649 A.2d 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). 
286 See generally Town of Weymouth v. James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, (Super. 
Ct. 1996); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Baker Indus., Inc., 649 A.2d 1325 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1994). 
287 See 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4], at 17-248. 
288 See Kulbaski, supra note 190, at 1031–33. 
289 See Sch. Bd. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 327 (Va. 1987); Peacock, supra note 
2, at 225–28. 
290 See 5 The Law of Hazardous Waste, supra note 3, § 17.05[4][d], at 17-259; 
Baughman, supra note 40, at 682–83. 
291 See Mehs, supra note 7, at 965–66; Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1609–10. 
292 Mehs, supra note 7, at 966. 
293 Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 7, at 1607–08. 
294 See Klein v. Catalano, 437 N.E.2d 514, 520 (Mass. 1982); Town of Weymouth v. 
James J. Welch & Co., 6 Mass. L. Rep. 197, 198–200 (Super. Ct. 1996); Shields v. Shell Oil 
Co., 604 N.W.2d 719, 726 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) rev’d on other grounds, 621 N.W.2d 215 
(Mich. 2000); Kulbaski, supra note 190, at 1031–33; Statutes of Limitations, supra note 89, at 
1185. 
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taneously serve both the interests of plaintiffs and defendants may be 
the drafting of legislation to modify statutes of repose in ways that 
strike a compromise between the ability of plaintiffs to accrue a cause 
of action and the right of defendants to claim immunity after a period 
of time. In this regard, state legislatures should take the examples of 
Connecticut, Illinois, and Florida295 and consider amending statutes 
of repose to better account for latent characteristics common to many 
environmental injuries. Appropriate amendments include allowing 
for extensions to ªle lawsuits—where injuries were discovered at the 
last minute—or lengthening the repose periods. Ultimately, however, 
each jurisdiction must determine when, how, or whether to apply 
statutes of repose, thus excusing defendants for their environmental 
harms, or whether to set aside statutes of repose and adopt the old 
maxim that “no man may take advantage of his own wrong.”296
                                                                                                                      
295 See supra notes 276–81 and accompanying text. 
296 Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959). 
